South Korea establishes a development timetable
With its Nov. 6 approval of a basic acquisition strategy for Jang Bogo N, South Korea’s Defense Project Promotion Committee set a more definite course for the country’s first nuclear-powered submarine program, which the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) described in a release published through the government’s Policy Briefing service three days later. Under the timetable presented by DAPA, domestic development would begin in 2027, and the navy would receive the submarines from the late 2030s onward, while the program’s total cost remains under analysis and the arrangements for supplying reactor fuel are proceeding on a separate track. The committee’s decision therefore establishes the sequence for pursuing the submarines at home, with the financial and international agreements needed to carry that sequence through still taking shape. [DAPA release · Yonhap]
Alongside the decisions on designing and building the boats, Seoul faces a separate negotiation over the material that will power its reactors, with a South Korean defense acquisition official telling The Korea Times that the government intends to pursue a military nuclear cooperation agreement with Washington along the legal route used for Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS. As that agreement works its way through preliminary discussions, South Korea is advancing its domestic procurement preparations, leaving the emerging shipbuilding timetable dependent on a future understanding over the terms, source and transfer of reactor fuel. [The Korea Times]
The first design contracts take shape
According to reporters who attended DAPA’s background briefing, the work scheduled to begin in 2027 spans four related areas—the submarine platform, its nuclear propulsion system, its combat system and the supporting facilities—with Yonhap reporting that the agency intends to select a shipbuilder through open competition in the first half of that year before signing a contract by year’s end. The government also plans to purchase the reactors directly, an arrangement that places their procurement under its own responsibility, while the detailed work packages and proposed contracting dates come from the journalists’ accounts of the briefing rather than the shorter public DAPA announcement. [Yonhap · Herald Business · DAPA release]
Having outlined a broader plan in May that envisaged launching the first submarine in the mid-2030s and then carrying it through trials and acceptance before entering service later in the decade or beyond, South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense has now seen that schedule acquire a more specific procurement pathway through the November committee decision. In a Nov. 13 report citing the National Assembly Defense Committee’s budget review, Herald Business said the proposed 2027 government budget included 96.6 billion won for the program’s initial work, comprising, among other items, 44 billion won for platform design and 41.33 billion won for propulsion-system development; those amounts remained subject to parliamentary consideration while overseas consultations and the assessment of the full program cost continued. The approval addresses the initial acquisition effort, with any subsequent submarines requiring further decisions of their own. [MND May plan · Herald Business, Nov. 13 · The Korea Times]
Washington’s separate decision on reactor fuel
Although designed to carry conventional weapons, the Jang Bogo N submarines would draw their propulsion from nuclear reactors, for which South Korea’s May defense plan specifies low-enriched uranium and seeks extended operating intervals between refuelings. In November 2025, a White House fact sheet said Washington had approved South Korea’s construction of nuclear-powered attack submarines and would work with Seoul to explore ways of obtaining fuel, establishing a political basis for talks whose practical terms—the fuel source, the conditions of transfer and the delivery timetable—remain to be determined in an agreement separate from DAPA’s latest acquisition decision. [MND May plan · White House fact sheet · DAPA release]
Because supplying nuclear material for naval propulsion falls under a distinct part of American law, any military cooperation agreement of the kind Seoul is pursuing would follow Section 91(c) of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2121(c), together with the requirement for a Section 123 agreement and the applicable presidential determination concerning the common defense and security. Under Section 123(d), an agreement of this kind would then be submitted to Congress for 60 days of continuous session, with the foreign affairs and armed services committees of both chambers participating in review after the agreement and required supporting materials, including a Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement if required under Section 123(a), had been provided. The White House’s 2025 announcement thus precedes a negotiated legal instrument and a further stage of congressional scrutiny, each with requirements beyond the initial political commitment. [42 U.S.C. §§ 2121(c), 2153(a), 2153(d) · White House fact sheet]
Once the governments reached an agreement, Congress would be able to examine its terms and, under the ordinary Section 91(c) procedure, block it through an enacted joint resolution of disapproval during the statutory review period, whereas Section 123(a)’s separate presidential-exemption mechanism applies to categories of cooperation outside Section 91(c). For the moment, the negotiation itself remains the immediate obstacle: The Korea Times reported one vice-ministerial consultation by Nov. 8, with Herald Business dating that meeting to June 2–3, and the latter publication said on Nov. 13, citing a parliamentary review and a senior presidential official, that the fuel discussions had remained at their June stage while scheduling for another round was pending. Reaching an agreed text would therefore be the next substantive development before the statutory congressional process could begin. [42 U.S.C. § 2153(a), (d) · The Korea Times · Herald Business, Nov. 13]
Seoul opens a parallel dialogue with the IAEA
As Seoul advances the submarine project and its fuel negotiations, it is also consulting with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the safeguards procedures that would apply to nuclear material used for naval propulsion, a process Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi described in his Sept. 7 statement to the Board of Governors after South Korea formally notified the agency of its intention to begin Article 14 consultations and submitted the relevant declarations. At a Nov. 9 meeting in Vienna, South Korean Vice Minister for Strategy and Intelligence Jeong Yeon-doo called for continued transparent consultation on these safeguards questions, while Grossi proposed keeping technical discussions open, according to South Korea’s foreign ministry. The September notification and November exchange established the course of those consultations, with the specific arrangements governing the fuel still to be settled. [South Korean Foreign Ministry, Nov. 10] [IAEA director general’s Sept. 7 statement]
Under Article 14 of South Korea’s comprehensive safeguards agreement, the country and the IAEA may agree on procedures for nuclear material entering a permitted, non-explosive military activity, including a defined period during which ordinary safeguards would be suspended for that use while the agency remained informed of the material’s total quantity, composition and any exports. Once such material returned to peaceful purposes, ordinary safeguards would resume; the agency’s agreement would concern procedures and reporting rather than approval of the military activity itself, leaving the scope and timing of any future arrangement for Seoul and the agency to negotiate, as reflected in the September and November accounts of their ongoing consultations. [ROK–IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, INFCIRC/236, Article 14 · IAEA statement]
With the procurement strategy now approved, the coming year is expected to bring parliamentary consideration of the proposed startup budget, a competition to select a shipbuilder and further work toward a full estimate of the program’s cost, while the negotiations over U.S. reactor fuel and the consultations with the IAEA follow their own diplomatic and legal procedures. Each track bears on the eventual viability of the submarine program, but the timetable now published by DAPA establishes chiefly when Seoul intends to begin domestic development, whereas the timing of fuel delivery will depend on the agreements still being pursued. [Herald Business, Nov. 13 · Yonhap · The Korea Times · 42 U.S.C. § 2153(d)]
Publisher references
Each link goes to the publisher's own page, and titles are shown as published. Eligible official and independent publications also have an IPR Record that holds the citation only. Rights-held references are linked here without a separate Record. None of these references is part of IPR's collected records, and citing a publisher here does not mean a desk covers it.
Title as publishedWho published it
- Results of the 179th Defense Project Promotion Committee (English rendering; Korean title withheld under the DAPA link-only policy)
- (LEAD) Arms review committee approves plan for nuclear-powered submarine project
- 핵추진잠수함 ‘장보고 N’ 사업 본격 시동…2027년 착수
- Korea's nuclear submarine project faces hurdles despite key approval
- Republic of Korea Nuclear-Powered Submarine Development Master Plan (English rendering)
- Joint Fact Sheet on President Donald J. Trump’s Meeting with President Lee Jae-myung
- IAEA Director General’s Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors (7 September 2026)
- 42 U.S. Code § 2121 - Authority of Commission
- 42 U.S. Code § 2153 - Cooperation with other nations
- 핵잠 첫 예산 966억…한미 핵잠 협상은 ‘입구’도 못 들어서
- 외교전략정보본부장, 국제원자력기구(IAEA) 사무총장 면담(11.9.)
- INFCIRC/236
Cite this brief
Benjamin Yang, “South Korea Sets Its Nuclear-Powered Submarine Timetable as Fuel Talks Continue,” Indo-Pacific Record Briefs No. 26, Indo-Pacific Record, week ending 2026-11-14. https://indopacificrecord.org/briefs/south-korea-nuclear-submarine-strategy-fuel-2026.html
