Bersama Lima 2026 Tests Five-Power Coordination at Sea

The exercise

The Royal Navy reported on 23 October that HMS Tamar and HMS Spey had completed the maritime phase of Exercise Bersama Lima 2026 alongside Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore. Its account described ten days at sea in the South China Sea, culminating in a two-day war game. The end-of-exercise report offers something more specific than a declaration of multinational solidarity: it identifies how personnel from different navies actually worked from one another’s ships.

The operation was part of the long-running Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), established in 1971. Australia’s Defence Department identified Singapore as host and described combined maritime, air and land training. Its announced contingent comprised around 220 personnel, the replenishment ship HMAS Stalwart and embarked MH-60R helicopter, F-35A fighters and P-8A maritime patrol aircraft. This pre-exercise statement describes intended participation rather than providing an after-action assessment.

A 23 October USNI News report described the wider exercise as running from 5 to 23 October, with about 1,900 participants, seven ships, one submarine and 42 aircraft. These are reported exercise totals, not a measure of combat performance. Most of the training occurred before the 18–24 October reporting week; its conclusion and the official account of what took place were the week’s relevant developments.

What stood out

The clearest example of integration is the Royal Navy’s account of a Royal New Zealand Navy Deployable Boarding Team embarked on HMS Tamar. The team trained repeatedly against scenarios involving suspected illegal fishing and narcotics smuggling. A British ship and boats supported New Zealand specialists: a bounded, practical instance of combined maritime-security work that required compatible procedures and communication.

That arrangement was deliberate rather than improvised at sea. The Royal Navy says the participants spent their first week alongside learning about one another’s vessels, equipment, working methods and terminology. Its 2 October preview had already identified the New Zealand boarding team aboard Tamar and described familiarisation as preparation for the dynamic phase. The October 23 account confirms that the cross-national training occurred, though it does not disclose standardized test results.

The maritime training also included soldiers directing naval gunfire toward targets ashore, a submarine hunt and air-defence serials supported by aircraft, according to the Royal Navy’s closing account. The British commander referred to Singapore’s newest submarine among the assets involved. Neither the Navy’s summary nor the other sources reviewed identifies the submarine’s precise task in the hunt, so a claim that it played a particular opposing or friendly role would go beyond the evidence.

A small detail illustrates how cooperation extended beyond formal tactical serials. A sailor aboard Tamar described an exchange of supplies with Australia’s HMAS Stalwart while replenishing at sea. The Royal Navy account supports the occurrence of the exchange; it does not quantify the fuel, stores or operational throughput involved. A memorable shipboard anecdote is not a substitute for a logistics-performance assessment.

These activities show that the five militaries tested distinct forms of coordination, not that the FPDA as a whole has demonstrably increased its fighting effectiveness. Hosting a foreign boarding team, aligning communications and operating alongside submarines or aircraft are observable exercise tasks. Whether they were completed within planned time limits, required repeated attempts or exposed deficiencies is not documented in the public accounts.

Why it matters

The year-on-year comparison reinforces that distinction. The Royal Air Force’s closing account for Bersama Lima 2025 described more than 4,000 defence personnel across three weeks and included the UK Carrier Strike Group. In contrast, the 2026 Royal Navy account foregrounded two patrol ships, each with crews of about 60. That does not establish that the whole UK contribution was limited to those crews, or that fewer high-end capabilities were exercised overall.

The Australian figures point in the same direction without providing a directly comparable total. Canberra announced approximately 400 personnel for 2025 and 220 for 2026. Differences in host country, reporting timing and counting methods limit what these figures establish. It is safer to say that the reported contributions and highlighted assets changed than that the FPDA either grew or shrank in capability.

What the change does show is flexibility in the kinds of assets members bring. The 2025 British account emphasized a carrier strike group, RAF Voyager refuelling and A400M cooperation with Australian fighters. The 2026 British and Australian accounts instead make visible multinational boarding operations, patrol ships, a replenishment vessel, fifth-generation aircraft and maritime surveillance. A changing inventory is not, without standardized assessments, a trend in effectiveness. [2025 UK account] · [2026 Australian account]

Member governments also present the same exercise through different national priorities. Australia’s 7 October statement emphasized collective deterrence, the 2026 National Defence Strategy and the ability to integrate maritime, air, land and information capabilities. The Royal Navy’s closing account emphasized safeguarding regional freedom and prosperity and described the maritime phase in the South China Sea. These are institutional public messages, not evidence that the FPDA planned a coordinated signal to any specific third country.

The language of official success needs equal care. HMS Tamar’s commanding officer, Commander Tom Lindsey, assessed that the serials demonstrated the ability to assemble and operate a task group quickly. That is a relevant participant assessment, but the published report provides no timings, independent evaluation, failures or repetition rates against which to test it. The available documents are stronger evidence for what was attempted than for how well it worked.

Much of the exercise was routine by design. Annual multinational training, maritime boarding, air defence and air-to-air refuelling all have antecedents. The 2025 RAF account describes refuelling and combined air tasking; the 2026 Royal Navy preview anticipated boarding, gunfire and a submarine hunt before the exercise began. The important reporting question is not whether every serial was new, but whether documented arrangements became more demanding or more effective.

What to watch next

Three kinds of follow-up evidence would sharpen the assessment: after-action figures showing whether multinational teams met their targets; a breakdown of command-post and field interoperability, including how information moved between services; and comparable descriptions of the 2027 programme. These would allow readers to assess an operational change rather than take official declarations of improved cooperation at face value.

For now, the durable finding is narrower: Bersama Lima 2026 brought different national assets and personnel into identifiable joint tasks, with the British–New Zealand boarding team providing the clearest documented example. The gap between conducting a multinational exercise and demonstrating measurable improvement in interoperability remains open. That gap is precisely what later FPDA reporting should address.